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APRIL 28, 2000 VOL. 26 NO. 16 | SEARCH ASIAWEEK VIEWPOINT From Foe To Friend? The summit has to deliver real change. It just might By AIDAN FOSTER-CARTER
And don't overlook the personal chemistry. Koreans call it i shim chon shim: spark from heart to heart. What will they make of each other: the affable dissident turned statesman, and the shy dauphin thrust onto the throne by his father's death? Credit is due to both for getting this far; it took courage. DJ's critics cry appeasement, while JI must watch his generals - who have much to lose from any outbreak of peace. But then what? As I have argued before ["Beyond Groundhog Day," VIEWPOINT, Nov. 5, 1999], we have had too many false starts. In 1972, a joint statement. In 1985, an economic accord (unimplemented) and family reunions (one-off). During 1990-92, eight rounds of premiers' talks produced a comprehensive deal - on paper. Three "breakthroughs" in as many decades, but none of them took root and grew. On the bright side, the 1991 agreement set up an institutional framework that can be activated. Its 25 clauses provide for committees on politics, military matters, and exchanges and cooperation (economic, cultural, social). Some parts of this are easier than others. Concerts and sports meetings are not a problem, as seen at the start and end of the 1990s (but not in between). The summit should set up an ongoing cultural program, never to be suspended again. Family reunions too are not so hard; they are already occurring by private initiative. Economic cooperation is also easy, at least initially - and has picked up speed since DJ's Sunshine Policy gave the green light to business. Trade of $333 million - peanuts to Seoul - made South Korea the North's third-biggest partner last year. There are 581 southern firms now trading with North Korea, led by Hyundai, whose tours have taken 200,000 South Koreans beyond the DMZ. A further 9,600 went north on other business in the past two years. To those who recall the past, this is already revolution. Yet it is only a start. The next step - offered in DJ's Berlin Declaration in March - is to begin to rebuild the North's tottering infrastructure. Overall this will cost a fortune. But so dire is North Korea's plight, and so huge the gap between the two, that even sums which are small change to the chaebol could make a big impact. Item: The new Pyongyang-Nampo freeway is being built by children, by hand. A few Hyundai bulldozers would speed construction, ensure quality - and get the kids back in school. But JI cannot expect DJ to sign a blank check. South Korea has two demands. The easier one is recognition. Pyongyang must give up its perverse refusal, once and for all, to acknowledge South Korea as a state. The summit de facto concedes this, as does the 1991 pact. The South accepts the North's existence; it is time for reciprocity. That will be hard for North Korea, though it involves no more than swallowing pride. Much harder will be Seoul's second condition. It is not about to renovate northern roads and railways if there is the slightest risk that they might be used to speed tanks and troop trains southward. Pyongyang must offer credible security guarantees, or cooperation will be stillborn. The difficulty here is twofold. As well as the northern army's reluctance to yield, there is the challenge of coordinating policy between Seoul and its allies in a plethora of forums, none moving fast. Will the four-party talks - the two Koreas, China and the U.S. - continue as the main avenue for peace talks, or be abandoned? Will Pyongyang, or Washington, want their bilateral dialogue to remain the major channel for tackling weapons of mass destruction: missiles, lingering nuclear doubts, and the ungrasped nettle of chemical and biological warfare? One major plus is that, for the first time in over a century, there is convergence among the powers. If DJ can bring JI in from the cold, there will be sighs of relief in Beijing and Moscow as much as Washington and Tokyo. It helps that DJ is the first South Korean president with a global perspective and grasp. He will be careful to coordinate every step with friends and neighbors. But perhaps this is already presuming too much. JI is ready to meet - but to deal? Possibly not. After the summit, he may conclude - or his generals insist - that North Korea risks too much if it changes its path. If it opens to the South, if it starts to disarm, isn't this the road to ruin? Look at the U.S.S.R. and East Germany. Yet the real disaster will be if Pyongyang continues on its present road to nowhere. Kim Dae Jung must persuade his host to think Deng Xiaoping rather than Gorbachev, win-win rather than zero-sum. If anyone can do it, he can. In 1993, it was my privilege to spend several days discussing unification with DJ in Cambridge. Whereas I expected North Korea to collapse, he insisted that a soft landing and inter-Korean cooperation were by far the better option. I was wrong, and he is right. I pray that Kim Jong Il finds him as sincere and persuasive as I did. Write to Asiaweek at mail@web.asiaweek.com Quick Scroll: More stories from Asiaweek, TIME and CNN |
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