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MAY 19, 2000 VOL. 27 NO. 19 | SEARCH ASIAWEEK Colombo's Battle for Jaffna Why the government cannot afford to lose By ARJUNA RANAWANA For half a century, the Sri Lankan army has maintained a garrison at a narrow causeway called Elephant Pass, which links northern Jaffna Peninsula to the rest of the island nation. The base is critical to keeping at bay the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in its 17-year war with Colombo to carve out an independent Tamil state. But in a determined attack on April 22, the Tigers dislodged the military from Elephant Pass. Conceded President Chandrika Kumaratunga: "The army has suffered a serious setback." At stake is not just whether the government can hold on to Jaffna, the hugely strategic cockpit of ethnic Tamil aspirations for a homeland, but also Kumaratunga's own standing. The president was in London for further treatment for the eye injury she received in last December's Tiger assassination attempt when the debacle occurred. She rushed back to take charge. For the first time in the country's post-Independence history she invoked the Public Security Ordinance - a law last used by the British during World War II - which gives the government sweeping powers to harness the country's resources to fight a war. The regulation imposes censorship on all media, and gives the authorities the power to take over private property and to detain suspects for up to one year without trial. And Kumaratunga vowed to defend Jaffna: "We will not allow Jaffna to fall into the fascist clutches of the LTTE." Brave words, but can they be backed by action? The Jaffna Peninsula is home to some 450,000 people, nearly all Tamil. (The minority Tamils number about 2.3 million nationwide out of a total population of 19 million, of which the majority Sinhalese make up nearly 80%.) For a number of years the Tigers, who are led by supremo Velupillai Prabhakaran, actually controlled most of Jaffna effectively as a separate state. But in 1995 the army drove the Tigers into the jungles further south and have since confidently held the peninsula - until now. The rout did not end with Elephant Pass. Just days later, the base at Pallai fell too, while the naval center at Kilali was also attacked, though it held (see map). In short, the Tigers are swarming ever closer again to Jaffna, where some 28,000 troops are garrisoned, fully one-third of the army's total strength. The military says about 500 fighters from each side have died in the current fighting. By May 10, new defense lines 15 km southeast of Jaffna were more or less holding, giving the military a chance to rush weapons and fresh troops to the area and even prep for a counter-attack. Already air-force bombers and long-range artillery are shelling Elephant Pass. But the Jaffna garrison remains under deep threat. Last week an influential Sinhalese Buddhist group suggested that the government seek help from neighboring India. Shortly afterward, India's high commissioner to Sri Lanka, Shiv Shankar Menon, who is considered close to Kumaratunga, flew to New Delhi to confer with the Indian leadership. Mangala Moonasinghe, Sri Lanka's envoy in India, says his government "has not made any request but we have apprised India of the situation." Jaswant Singh, India's external affairs minister, acknowledged that there were approaches from Colombo but did not reveal if they had to do with military help or with a possible evacuation by sea. Either way, any India role could hurt Kumaratunga politically. It would bring back bad memories of the failed (for both Colombo and New Delhi) intervention in Jaffna in the late 1980s by Indian peacekeepers, who eventually gave way humiliatingly to the Tigers. Kumaratunga has also come under attack for what her critics say is flip-flopping between confrontation and negotiation. Says Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu of Colombo's Center for Policy Analysis: "First the government waged war for peace. Then it agreed to the Norwegian effort [to mediate]. Now it has to take a hardline stand to defend Jaffna." Kumaratunga is also drawing fire for imposing censorship and suspending some civil liberties. The main opposition United National Party says the restrictions might be used to suppress dissent in the run-up to coming general elections. But the biggest factor is Jaffna. Says Saravanamuttu: "Jaffna has been invested with so much political symbolism - it is vital for both sides." Right now more vital for Kumaratunga than for her nemesis Prabhakaran. With additional reporting bySanjay Kapoor/New Delhi Write to Asiaweek at mail@web.asiaweek.com Quick Scroll: More stories from Asiaweek, TIME and CNN |
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